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Dairy farmers often rank the benefit from a secure market as a major reason
for belonging to a milk-marketing cooperative. This paper proposes a technique
for valuing this decreased market risk through development of a willingness-to-
pay measure.
A Proposed Technique for Assessing Dairy
Farmer's Valuation ofDecreased Market Risk
Offered by Cooperatives
A cooperative is an economic institution through which autonomous
economic units canjointly carry on activities common to their individual
economicpursuits. Manydairyfarmers belongtomilkmarketingcoopera-
tives that allow them to take advantage of economies of scale in milk
marketing, integrate forward into milk packaging and processing, and
increasetheirbargainingpower. Further, thepresenceofanassuredmar-
ket or decreased market risk is often cited by dairy farmers as being the
most common reason for cooperative membership (Jensen 1990).
A loss ofmarket access by a dairy farmer who has large capital invest-
ments in nonliquid assets canbe financially devastatingbecauseproduc-
tion costs are sunk at the time of the transaction and milk is highly
perishable (Staatz 1987). Provision ofsecureand long-termaccess to out-
putmarketsisa mainadvantageofthecooperativeoveraninvestor-owned
milk handler. A recent national survey of milk marketers reported that
95% of the surveyed cooperatives guaranteed a market for their dairy
farmers versus 51% of the investor-owned processors (Schrader, et al.
1985). Both the processorsandGradeA dairyfarmers rated marketguar-
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anteesasbeingveryimportant.Theseresultswereconsistentwithanearly
studywhere 87% ofthe cooperative cheese plants surveyed guaranteed a
daily market for farmers' milk, versus only 76% of the non-cooperative
firms (Babb 1980).
Despite the acceptance ofmarket risk as a primary cooperative benefit,
its economic value "defies quantification" (Mengel 1988). Quantification
ofthismarketsecuritybenefitofferedbycooperativeshasvaluetocoopera-
tives that are in a business environment with many competitors. Dairy
marketing cooperatives are continually competing for a producer's milk
with investor-owned firms. The package ofbenefits that the cooperative
offers is often the deciding factor in the farmer's decision. Benefits from
cooperative endeavors can only be listed, but no dollar value can be tied
to each benefit. QuantifYing the value of market security will allow the
cooperative and prospective member to place a dollarvalue on an impor-
tant benefit to membership. Further, a documented reduced risk due to
cooperative membership would have implication for agricultural lenders.
If cooperative membership reduces income variance, then the member
would be a more attractive loan applicant.
Economists, until now, have been unable to develop a technique for
estimating this illusive yet crucialbenefit. In this paper, a tractable tech-
niqueis presentedthatallowsvaluationofdecreasedmarketriskbyusing
a willingnesstoaccept(orpay) measure.Thisisthefirstpublishedattempt
to establish a rigorous procedure for measuring the benefit ofdecreased
market risk. The technique calls for the use ofdata that are notyet avail-
able. The value ofpublishing the technique is that researchers will have
gUidance on what data is needed for future research.
Market Uncertainty
As mentioned before, loss of market access is a real threat for many
dairyfarmers. Themarketingchoicefor thefarmeris generallytwodimen-
sional-either sell through a cooperative or through an investor-owned
handler.This choiceofmarketoutletaffects themarketriskto the farmer.
In times ofmilk surplus, an investor-owned handler has been known to
"cherry pick." In this practice, producers who are small, inconveniently
located, orhaveothernonprofitablecharacteristicsaredroppedassuppli-
ers. Besides cherry picking, an investor-owned handler may go out of
business, leaving all its former suppliers without a milk market. Since
most individual farmers do not have the storage capacity for their milk,
a farmer that does not have a market will have to dump milk until a new
market is obtained. Cooperatives also go outofbusiness on occasion, but
the member-controlled nature of the business allows members to know
in advance about the difficulties, allowing them to find other outlets for
their milk. Some investor-owned handlers who are going bankrupt con-
tinue to collectmilk, andfarmers arenotinformedofthebankruptcyuntil
their checks are returned for insufficient funds.
The proposed valuation technique is, in this paper, based on the
assumptionthatdecreasedmarketriskisrelatedtothedifferencebetween
the income probabilitydistribution that the farmer would face marketing
through a farmer cooperative (co-op) versus marketing throughan inves-66 JOURNAL OF COOPERATIVES 1995
tor-ownedhandler(IOF). Thecooperative, throughtheguaranteedmarket,
reduces the variance ofpossible incomes received by the farmer.
To further explainthis concept, considertwo hypotheticaldairyfarmers
located adjacent to each other. Assume their scale is approximately the
same, as is input use and technology. The expected income from a co-op
oran IOF for each farmer is essentially identical, and each farmer makes
the choice between a co-op oran IOF based on this same expected value.
Yet one farmer may choose the cooperative and the other the investor-
owned handler. The different choices must be related to differences in
individual risk preferences. The farmer who is more risk averse will give
more weight to income variance differences than the less risk averse
farmer.
A technique for measuring the value of decreased market risk must
incorporateriskpreferences inthe evaluationofalternative income distri-
butions. The nextsection develops this technique by deriving the amount
of money a farmer would accept to be indifferent between two income
distributions.
Measure Development
A viable technique mustbe able to rank income distributions, and sev-
eral methods are available in the literature. First and second degree sto-
chastic dominance are commonly used, although they rarely result in
completeorderingsofdistributions (Kingand Robison 1981). Elicited util-
ity functions are also used as ordering criteria. The practical difficulties
in obtaining complete and accurate utility functions make this technique
susceptible to error. Stochastic dominance with respect to a function
(SDWRF) provides an intermediate option.
SDWRF uses the Pratt-Arrow absolute risk aversion coefficient. This
coefficient is defined as r(x) = -u"(x)/u'(x) where x in this case is income
and u is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. A value of r=O
represents an individual with constant marginal utility of income and
absoluteriskneutrality.Thisindividualwouldchoosebetweentwoincome
distributions based only on expected income. The coefficient is positive
for all risk averse decision makers (declining marginal utility of income)
and a higher value indicates a greater degree ofrisk aversion.
SDWRF requires only the assumption that the farmer's absolute risk
aversion coefficientiswithinanupperand lowerbound. The effectiveness
ofSDWRF depends on the width of the intervals being used. Several
researchers (Wilson and Eidman 1983; King and Robison 1981; Tauer
1986) haveresearchedfeasibleupperandlowerboundsfororderingdiffer-
entincomedistributions. Raskinand Cochran (1986) further investigated
the sensitivity ofmarginal utility to risk coefficients.
Much literaturerelates to SDWRF, butofparticularinterestis previous
work by Bosch and Eidman (1987) who used SDWRF to choose between
anincomedistributionwithandwithoutinformation.Theythenestimated
an amount that would make the two distributions stochastically equal.
This is relevant because marketsecuritycanbeviewed as a similar prob-
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income distribution from a relatively guaranteed market and that from a
more uncertain market is a measure ofthe value ofmarket security.
Hypothetical distributions are used for exposition. Consider a farmer
choosing between two income distributions, each with five possible out-
comes. Distribution C is associated with a farmer marketing through a
cooperative, and distribution H is associated with marketing through an
investor-ownedhandler.Thehypotheticaldistributions, chosenforexposi-
















The expectedvalue ofeach income distribution is $24,200; a risk neutral
individual (r = 0) would be indifferent between the two distributions, and
decreased market risk would have no value to this individual. However,
thestandarddeviationforCis$1,483andforHis$3,701.Thehypothetical
distributions have equal expectedvalues to isolate the variance-reducing
effectofa securemarket. Inthe following sections, SDWRFisused torank
these distributions and then to derive the amount that would make the
farmer indifferent between them.
Define the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of distribution C as
C(x) and the CDF of distribution H as H(x). Following Meyer (1977), the
solutionprocedurefor orderingincomedistributionsusingSDWRFidenti-
fies the utility function that minimizes:
subject to
L: [H(x) - C(x)]u'(x)dx (1)
(2)
If (1) is positive for a given set ofdecision makers, then members ofthis
setunanimouslyprefer C(x) to H(x). If (1) is zero, then neitherdistribution
isunanimouslypreferred sinceanindividualinthe setofdecisionmakers
is indifferentbetweenthe distributions. If(1) is negative, C(x) isnotunani-
mously preferred to H(x), and a new equation
I_)C(x) - H(x)]u'(x)dx (3)
is minimized subject to the same constraint. If(3) is positive, then H(x) is
unanimously preferred to C(x) for all decision makers with absolute risk
coefficients in the interval [rj,r21. If (3) is negative, then SDWRF cannot
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'Meyer developed an optimal control methodology for ordering distribu-
tions using SDWRF. His theorem states
{
r1(x) ifL: [H(x)-C(x)]u'(x)dx<O
r= r2(x) ifI_: [H(x) - C(x)]u'(x)dX2:0.
To understand more fully, consider a farmer facing the distributions
presented above whose risk coefficient is within the closed interval of
rl=0.00005 and r2=0.0001. To solve the optimal control problem set up
byMeyer, a negativeexponentialform ofutility, u(x) - e-
rxcanbeassumed.
This provides constant upper and lower bounds on r. Since the objective
function has a value of 0 above $28,000, the upper limit of integration
becomes$28,000.Anintermediatevalueoftheobjectivefunctioniscalcu-
lated each time the value of [H(x) - C(x)] changes. According to Meyer's
theorem, the controlvalueisinitially0.00005.Thefirst intervalofintegra-
tion is $27,000 to $28,000. The value ofthe objective function over this
range is
I2~~~~~0 [H(x) - C(x)]u'(x)dx
=I28.000 (-1/5)(0 00005)e~0.00005xdx 27.000 .
= - 0.002529.
(4)
Since this value is negative, the control value remains at 0.00005. The
integral from $26,000 to $27,000 is -0.005317, and the integral from
$24,000 to $26,000is - 0.005732.Theintermediatevalue ofthe objective
function from $24,000 to $28,000 is -0.013578.
The final non-zero interval of [H(x) - C(x)] is $19,000 to $24,000. The
intermediate value ofthe objective function over this range is 0.021075.
Since this is greaterin absolutevalue than -0.013578, the controlvalue
will change somewherebetween$19,000 and $24,000. Iterations indicate
the objective function changes sign at approximately $19,935. Thus,
0.0001 is the control value from $19,935 to $19,000. The intermediate
value ofthe objective function integrated over this interval is 0.002670.
Since the value of the minimized objective function is positive, H(x) is
preferred to C(x) by all decision makers whose risk aversion coefficient is
always between 0.00005 and 0.0001. Further, the utility function that
minimizes the objective function is defined by:
r={0.00005 when x2:$19,935 (5)
0.0001 when x<$19,935.
Willingness to Accept (or Pay)
A farmer paid the willingness to accept (WTA) amount is hypothetically
indifferent between marketing through an independent handler (and
receiving the WfA amount) and belonging to a cooperative.
When the value of(1) is zero, an individual in the relevant risk aversion
coefficientrangeisindifferentbetweenthetwodistributions.WfAiscalcu-Dairy Farmer's Valuation ofMarket Security/Smith and Roach 69
latedas the amountofmoneyadded to eachpossible outcomeindistribu-
tion H such that the overall value ofthe objective function becomes zero.
Whenthevalue of(1) is zero, a valuefor (3) must alsobe calculated. When
the value of (3) is also zero, an individual in the relevant risk coefficient
range is indifferent between the two distributions. Estimates ofWTA can
be obtained by solving for E) and Ez in the following:
L: [C(x)-H(X+E))]U'(x)dx=O
L: [H(x+ Ez) - C(x)]u'(x)dx= O.







Note that (8) and (9) are differences between the expected utilities ofthe
two distributions. These equations can also be written as
f_: c(x)u(x)dx-f_: h(x+Edu(x)dx=0
L: (h(x+E2)u(x)dx-Ix x c(x)u(x)dx=O
(10)
(11)
where h(x) and c(x) are probability density functions.
Theincome probabilitydistributions presentedinthe previous example
are discrete. (10) and (11) can be written in discrete form as:
m n




~ h(xi+ Ez)U(X) - ~ c(Xj)u(x) = O. (13)
i~) j~)
Inthe example m = n butthe WTAexpression is developed for the general
case ofm f= n.
By assuming the negative exponential form ofthe utility function, (12)




and solving for E)
{
(~ -e-rxjHn)}





A similar expression defines Ez except that the other bound on the risk
coefficient would be used. Thus, two estimates for willingness to accept
are obtained by this procedure.
The validity of (15) is contingent on the value ofthe objective function
not changing sign and thus the same control value being used. Ifthis is70 JOURNAL OF COOPERATIVES 1995
not the case, (10) and (11) would be solved by iterating the WTA value
until equality holds.
Equation (15) is used to obtain WTA values for the simulation. First, r
is 0.00005 and calculations yield a value of$235 forWTA. Using a r value
of0.0001, a value of$476 is obtained. The lower bound value of r gives
the lower estimate ofWTA and the upper bound value ofr results in the
higher estimate ofWTA.
The sensitivity ofWTA is explored by defining different intervals ofrisk
coefficients. The schedule below shows that the annual WTA estimates
become relatively significant when r is in the range of values used by
previous researchers (Tauer 1986; King and Robison 1981):
Risk Coefficient Interval Low Estimate ofWTA High Estimate ofWTA
0.00001 to 0.00003 $ 46 $139
0.00003 to 0.00005 $139 $235
0.00005 to 0.0001 $235 $476
0.0001 to 0.0002 $476 $953
0.0002 to 0.0003 $953 $1388
0.0003 to 0.0005 $1388 $2050
0.0005 to 0.001 $2050 $2760
Conclusions
Past research has documented that dairy farmers consider the benefit
ofdecreased market risk as the primary reason for belonging to a dairy
marketing cooperative. Economists have, until the technique presented
in this paper, been unable to quantifythe value ofthis important benefit.
Thevalueofmarketsecuritytoanindividualfarmercannowbeestimated
and a reasonable estimate ofmarket security obtained.
A farmer obviously makes the choice between the cooperative and the
investor-owned handler based on individual risk preferences. Coopera-





handler and to a cooperative. The WTA amount can be calculated by
employing Meyer's technique for choosing between two stochastic func-
tions. Stochasticdominancewithrespectto a function canbeused to first
rank income distributions and to then derive the annual amount that a
farmer would accept to be indifferent between distributions.
Theexampleusedto aidinexpositionofthetechniquewastwo distribu-
tions with equal expected values but different variances. A conservative




Nowthata techniqueis available,marketsecurity'sactualvalueto dairy
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require primary data collection. Of interest is to estimate two income
distributions-one for cooperative members and one for producers who
do not belong to a cooperative. One possible strategy for data collection
would be to identify two samples ofdairy producers within a region. Ini-
tially, scaleorpoundsofmilkproducedshouldbeheldconstant.Therefore,
all producers in the sample shouldbe ofsimilar scale. One samplewould
be cooperative members and the other non-members. Each producer in
thesamplewouldbefollowed overtime. Dataonmilkincomewouldbethe
focus oftheinformationcollected. Researcherswouldbeableto determine
variance in income for the two groups. Income distributions can then be
estimated (initially for the average producer), which will be used to test
the hypothesis that cooperatives do indeed provide a lower variance in
income. Upper and lower bounds on the value of decreased market risk
can then be estimated.
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